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ABSTRACT
It is critical that state estimators used in the power grid output accurate
results even in the presence of erroneous measurement data. Traditional bad
data detection is designed to perform well against isolated random errors.
Interacting bad measurements, such as malicious data injection attacks, may
be difficult to detect. In this work, we analyze the sensitivities of specific
power system quantities to attacks. We compare real and reactive flow and
injection measurements as potential indicators of attack. The use of param-
eter estimation as a means of detecting attack is also investigated. For this
the state vector is augmented with known system parameters, allowing both
to be estimated simultaneously. Perturbing the system topology is shown to
enhance detectability through parameter estimation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Operators of the power grid rely on large networks of sensors, known as
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems, to monitor
conditions on the grid. To incorporate the many redundant measurements
available into a single coherent picture, the grid state is estimated from the
output of these sensors periodically. The state estimates affect both opera-
tional and economic functions, so it is critical that state estimates accurately
reflect the grid state.
State estimators are classified as DC state estimators, utilizing a linear
system model, or AC state estimators, using a nonlinear model. Under the
DC model, typical measurements consist of real power flows and injections
and states consist of bus angles [1].
Traditional bad data detectors are designed primarily to deal with random
sensor noise or errors. Potential sources for noisy or erroneous measurements
could be non-simultaneity of measurement sampling, incorrect installation of
or damage to sensor, or communication errors. These schemes are designed
to detect isolated, random bad data. Interacting bad data is more difficult to
detect. A subclass of interacting bad data is malicious data injection attacks.
Malicious data injection attacks against state estimators were first written
about in [2]. These attacks consist of coordinated modifications to measure-
ments, such that modifications are coherent with the linearized model and
unmodified measurements. This conceals the presence of attacks from DC
state estimators completely. The effect of linear model attacks on nonlin-
ear estimators was shown to be diminished in [3]; however [4] showed the
potential for DC attacks to succeed on real EMS software using a nonlinear
model.
This paper examines the sensitivity of real and reactive power measure-
ment residuals in a nonlinear state estimator to false data injection attacks
based on a linearized model. The effects of malicious data injection attacks
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are shown to have varying degrees of effect on different measurement types
and that residuals of some measurement types are a much better indicator of
attacks. This paper also presents a detector based on parameter estimation
combined with topology perturbation of estimated parameters.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 State Estimation
State estimation is the use of measurements of a system to estimate un-
known system quantities. This allows a complete description of a system to
be developed from various redundant measurements. Accuracy can be im-
proved, because although the individual measurements are subject to error,
the impact of random errors in measurements is reduced by measurement
redundancy. In addition to potentially improving accuracy, state estimation
allows estimation of quantities that are difficult to measure directly, such as
phase angle.
The simplest form of state estimation for power systems uses a linearized
model to estimate bus voltage angles based on real power flows. This lin-
earized, or DC, approach neglects real series impedances, all shunt impedances,
real losses, and all reactive power. A flat voltage profile is also assumed.
Linearization decreases computation time, and may yield acceptable results.
The linear relationship between measurements z and states x under the DC
model is shown in Equation (2.1). H is a matrix containing the linearized
model information. H resembles the admittance matrix under these model
assumptions. The disadvantage of linearization is a loss of information. The
linearized state estimator will not give any information about the nonlinear
quantities neglected, including any reactive flows and injections, or bus volt-
age magnitudes. A state estimator using a nonlinear system model, or AC
state estimator, is necessary to obtain information about nonlinear quanti-
ties. For the AC case, H is a vector function relating measurements z to
states x as in Equation (2.2).
z = Hx (2.1)
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z = H(x) (2.2)
2.2 Parameter Estimation
System parameters can be estimated at the same time as system states by
augmenting the state equations. In the case of state augmentation, H be-
comes a vector function relating measurements z to states x and parameters
p as in Equation (2.3). For a linearized model, this augmentation changes
Equation (2.1) to Equation (2.4). The partition Hx in Equation (2.4) is the
original H matrix from Equation (2.1). In both cases, this means that the
number of equations to be solved simultaneously increases by the number of
additional parameters. This approach to parameter estimation through state
augmentation is one of the approaches from [1], and was the approach used
for this research.
z = H(x, p) (2.3)
z =
(
Hx Hp
0 I
)(
x
p
)
(2.4)
2.3 Bad Data Detection
State estimation uses models to produce estimates; essentially fitting data
to a model. Traditional bad data detection generally assumes that measure-
ment errors will be large and isolated, resulting in a poor fit to the model.
Detection of isolated bad data has been addressed in many works. As ex-
amples, a method using normalized residuals is addressed in [5] and another
based on the coherency between measurements with large residuals and the
other measurements in [6].
Detection of multiple bad data using various methods has also been inves-
tigated. Examples include [7], where a linear program was used to detect
multiple bad data sources that did not fit a Gaussian noise model, and [8],
where hypothesis testing was used for multiple and interacting bad data de-
4
tection.
2.4 Malicious Data Attacks and Detection
Data injected deliberately by an adversary would not be expected to follow
the same patterns as random bad data. A method of injecting bad data
into linearized state estimation (DC model) without changing measurement
residuals was demonstrated in [2] and [9]. These attacks are not detectable by
traditional bad data detection schemes accompanying linear state estimators
and are dubbed stealth attacks. To construct these attacks, the attacker
needs some knowledge of the system topology.
It was shown in [10] that full knowledge of system topology is not necessary,
and also that the attack based on the linearized model can be effective against
a non-linear estimator. Although [3] shows decreased effectiveness of linear
attacks when used against non-linear estimators, [4] shows that real EMS
software is indeed vulnerable to attack.
A data injection attack detection scheme, based on hardening of sets of
measurements, is shown in [11]. Measurements to be hardened are selected
such that observability is guaranteed for the operator, which is shown to be
necessary and sufficient to prevent stealth attacks. A Bayesian detector for
malicious data injection attacks is formulated in [12]. The efficient use of
encryption to thwart attacks is investigated in [13], where an algorithm to
maximize the utility of encrypted measurement placement is developed.
A financial incentive for attacks on state estimators is described in [14],
where it is shown that the use of malicious data injection by an adversary
can manipulate energy markets such that an attacker can guarantee trading
profits.
2.5 Topology Perturbation
A topology perturbation based detector for detection of malicious data is de-
veloped in [15]. That approach uses known topology perturbations (specif-
ically changes to impedance) applied to a power system as probes. The
expected system response is predicted and compared against the actual mea-
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surements. The topology perturbations are hidden from an attacker, so the
attacker is unable to correct the attack to remain stealthy. If measurement
values do not change as computed beforehand, an attack is assumed. Al-
though effective, this method has the disadvantage that it has to assume no
changes in load and generation between probes or account for such changes
making it difficult. The approach here is to estimate the parameter changes
with measurement data rather than to predict measurement changes. Fur-
thermore instead of probing the system, the estimate of the parameters can
be used for detection by leveraging regularly occurring perturbations.
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CHAPTER 3
SYSTEM LOSS AND PARAMETER BASED
DETECTION
3.1 Attacker Model
The attacker is assumed to have access to baseline topology information
necessary to formulate a DC attack oﬄine, i.e., at least one of the columns
of the sensitivity matrix used for linear state estimation. This information
is assumed to be static, and will not reflect changes such as line outages,
tap changes, or other topology or parameter changes. The attacker is also
assumed to have the ability to change a subset of measurements needed for
an attack. The change could occur by corrupting the measurement device
at the substation, interfering with communication between the substation
and control center, or by installation of malware at the control center. The
attacker is assumed not to have the ability to observe conditions across the
entire system.
3.2 Nonlinear Sensitivity Analysis
3.2.1 Overview
The sum of squared residuals of a state estimator’s output quantifies how well
the measurement data fits the model. This is useful for bad data detection,
as bad data would not be expected to fit the model well. Unlike bad data,
malicious data is designed to fit a model, albeit a simplified or partial model,
decreasing the impact on measurement residues. Using knowledge of the DC
model, we can predict what measurements would tend to be impacted most
by an attack. This work focuses on real and reactive power measurements.
Two classes of measurements, flows and injections, are considered here.
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The DC model neglects the effects of losses, uneven voltage profiles, and
reactive power on the power system. When an AC state estimator is attacked
using attacks based on a DC model, the residues increase due to these sim-
plifications. The magnitude of effect on real and reactive flows and injections
varies by measurement type.
For real flows, the DC model tends to underestimate their magnitude due
to neglecting real power losses. The impact of this simplification increases
with the square of current on a line. Reactive flows also have losses that
increase with the square of line current, however the high X/R ratio of power
lines means that reactive power transmission is inherently lossier than real
power transmission. When combined with the DC models neglect of reactive
power, the expected effect is for malicious data injection attacks to affect
reactive flow residues more than real flow residues.
The error from neglecting losses becomes more apparent when generator
power output is monitored. Losses have to be supplied by a generator, so
errors on flows due to neglecting losses will be accumulated at generators.
To verify these intuitions, and to examine the detectability of malicious
data injection attacks, the effect of attacks of various magnitudes on a com-
posite weighted residual, and on residues for real flows, reactive flows, real
generator injections, and reactive generator injections was investigated.
3.2.2 Establishing Baseline
Baseline residual values had to be established for comparison purposes. Mea-
surement residues are expected to vary under normal circumstances due to
noise. To establish the distribution of residuals expected due to this expected
noise, Monte Carlo trials were used. To do this, noise vector n was added to
measurement vector z, resulting in z∗ as seen below in Equation (3.1).
z∗ = z + n (3.1)
State estimation was conducted for many such random noise vectors, and
sums of squared residues of real and reactive flows and generator injections
were recorded separately and together as a weighted composite.
Using the distributions generated in this fashion, a threshold residue value
can be established. For values higher than this, malicious data is assumed.
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The cutoff is selected based on the acceptable proportion of false alarms.
For example, if 1% false alarms are acceptable, the cutoff chosen would be a
residue value higher than the residue for 99% of trials.
3.2.3 Comparison of Detectability
To determine the detectability of a particular attack vector at a particular
magnitude, the Monte Carlo procedure used in the previous section was
repeated for a system under attack. Noise vector n and attack vector a were
added to measurement vector z, resulting in z∗∗ as seen below in Equation
(3.2).
z∗∗ = z + n + a (3.2)
The detectability of an attack by a residual can be quantified by the pro-
portion of measurements above the baseline cutoff established earlier. For
example, if 80% of the distribution of residuals for the attacked system lies
above the cutoff, that attack would be considered 80% detectable. This allows
comparison of the effectiveness of residuals of specific measurement types for
detecting bad data, as well as comparing the detectability of different attacks.
The total detectability is the non-overlapping proportion of attacks de-
tected by any of the metrics. This may be larger than detectability based on
any single residual type.
3.3 Parameter Estimation
3.3.1 Overview
The use of parameter estimation to detect maliciously injected data was
also investigated. The state estimator was modified for this purpose. State
vector x augmented with parameters p to form x˜ as in Equation (3.3). The
equation used to relate system measurements and states becomes a function
of parameters as well, as shown in Equation (3.4).
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x˜ =
(
x
p
)
(3.3)
z˜ = h(x˜) (3.4)
And where z˜ is the measurement vector z augmented with parameter es-
timates p¯ as in Equation (3.5).
z˜ =
(
z
p¯
)
(3.5)
The sensitivity matrix H, which is the function h(.) as evaluated at each
iteration is also modified as shown in Equation (3.6).
H˜ =
(
Hx Hp
0 I
)
(3.6)
The parameters estimated could be any system parameter, for instance,
transformer tap position or capacitor bank setting. In this work, line series
reactance was considered as a parameter to estimate. Distributed flexible AC
transmission system (D-FACTS) devices were assumed to have been installed
on the system. This allows line impedance to be controlled by the control
center, and might be done for congestion management and loss minimization.
Installation of D-FACTS devices turns line reactances into variable pa-
rameters. If parameter values change, i.e. the D-FACTS setting is altered,
attacks based on pre-change values will perform poorly. If an attack is con-
structed for a system using the wrong parameter values, the interactions
between attacked measurements tends to drive parameter estimates toward
the values used to construct the attack vector. This increases parameter
estimate residues.
The residues on parameter estimates are more meaningful for the purpose
of malicious data detection than measurement residuals because the true
value of the parameter can be known with more precision. The parame-
ter value, unlike measurements, should not be affected by grid state. This
makes comparison of estimated parameters with their known values useful
for malicious data detection.
Detection of malicious data injection attacks is possible whenever the pa-
10
rameters are altered for control purposes and the alteration can be concealed
from the attacker at least for a while.
3.3.2 Establishing Baseline
As with measurement residuals in Section 3.2.2, baseline parameter residual
values had to be established for comparison purposes. To do this, noise
vector n was added to measurement vector z˜, resulting in z˜∗ as seen below in
Equation (3.7). Noise was limited to measurement values (not parameters).
z˜∗ = z˜ + n (3.7)
3.3.3 Determining Detectability
The procedure of Section 3.2.3 was repeated to generate distributions of
parameter residuals. To do this, measurement vector z˜ was augmented with
noise vector n, and attack vector a, resulting in z˜∗∗ as seen below in Equation
(3.8).
z˜∗∗ = z˜ + n + a (3.8)
The effects of perturbations on detectability can be determined by com-
paring distributions generated for the same attack vectors under different
system perturbations to each other and to the base case.
11
CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION
4.1 Nonlinear Sensitivity Analysis
4.1.1 Setup
Analysis was conducted on the IEEE 14-bus test case. State estimation was
executed using MATPOWER, a MATLAB power system simulation package.
Each noise vector n used for generating distributions in Monte Carlo trials
had entries consisting of a normally distributed random variable with zero
mean and standard deviation of 1% of the measurement value corresponding
to the entry in n. Distributions of measurement residuals for determining
baseline values and attack detectability were generated by executing state
estimation using 500 different noise vectors. The cutoff used to establish the
baseline as described in the previous section was the 99th percentile (i.e. 1%
false alarms).
4.1.2 Establishing Baseline
Data consisting of sums of squared residues of real and reactive flows and
injections were recorded separately and as a weighted composite. Histograms
of the result were generated from this data. An example for real power flows,
is shown below in Figure 4.1. From these histogram bin counts, a cumulative
density function plot was created by normalizing the histogram to have an
area of 1 and computing the cumulative sum of bin counts. The 99% cutoff
was established by finding the sum of squared residue value of the CDF at
the 99th percentile. An example for reactive power flows is shown below in
Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of sum of squared residues of reactive power flows for
500 random noise vectors.
4.1.3 Determining Detectability
Distributions of sums of squared residues were constructed for the system
under various attack regimes. In theory any linear combination of columns
of the DC H-matrix can serve as a stealth attack vector. For our experiments
we used individual columns of the DC H-matrix (14 in all) albeit scaled as
attack vectors.
Attack vectors were scaled such that the largest entry in each attack vector
corresponded to a 10MW injection (0.1 p.u. in 100 MVA base). Subsequent
trials increased the scale of attack vectors in 10MW steps up to 100MW,
so that each of the 14 columns of the DC H-matrix was used at each of
10 different power levels (10 to 100MW in 10MW increments). For every
distribution generated, the percentage of measurements falling above the
previously determined residual threshold was calculated.
It was predicted that generator injections, due to having to supply losses,
would be impacted most by malicious data injection attacks. Reactive flows
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Figure 4.2: CDF of sum of squared residues of reactive power flows for 500
random noise vectors. Horizontal line indicates 99th percentile. Vertical line
indicates value for sum of squared residues corresponding to 99th percentile.
were also expected to be impacted more than real flows. To compare the
relative sensitivities to attack, the residual with the highest proportion of
detectable attacks was recorded for each of the 14 attack columns at each
magnitude (140 in total). Table 4.1 contains counts of the number of attacks
for which a residual type is best, based on having the highest detectability
for that attack.
The grouped bar graph of Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of attacks de-
tected by each of the residual types at the 10MW attack level. The total
detectability is also shown, which indicates the proportion of attacks that
caused any one of the residuals to exceed its cutoff value. This is higher than
any residual type taken singly. As expected both Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3
show that there is significant difference in the residuals based on measure-
ment type and that residuals of real and reactive power injections are better
at indicating the presence of attack data.
Figure 4.4 shows the total detectability sampled at attack levels of 30MW,
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Table 4.1: Detection by Residual Type
Residual Type Attacks Detected Best
Weighted Composite 2
Real Power Flows 8
Real Power Injections 60
Reactive Power Flows 17
Reactive Power Injections 53
Figure 4.3: Grouped bars indicating the proportion of each attack detected
at the 10MW attack level. Bars in each group from left to right are
residuals of: the weighted composite residual, real power flow, real power
generation, reactive power flow, reactive power generation, and total
detectability.
50MW, 80MW, and 100MW. At 30MW, most of the attacks exceed one of
their residue thresholds and are detectable. Attacks based on columns 7,
10, and 14 in the DC H-matrix have the poorest detectability. And while
attacks based on column 7 begin to have good detectability from 50MW up-
ward, attacks based on columns 10 and 14 were still undetectable even at
attack magnitude of 80MW. As a reference the total injections in the system
are about 275MW. Attack based on column 14 reamind only partially de-
tectable even at attack magnitude of 100MW. Buses 10 and 14 were sparsely
connected, each only connecting to two other buses, and were not connected
to any buses with generation. These attacks required the least amount of
measurement modifications, and their distance from generation minimized
the impact on generator residuals.
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Figure 4.4: Grouped bars indicating the total proportion of each attack
column type detected at 30MW, 50MW, 80MW, and 100MW, attack levels.
4.2 Parameter Estimation
4.2.1 Setup
As was done previously, analysis was conducted on the IEEE 14-bus test case.
State estimation was executed using a modified version of MATPOWER.
The modified program estimates parameters simultaneously with states us-
ing state augmentation as described in Section 3.3.1, and was used in this
case to estimate line series reactances. Each noise vector n used for generat-
ing distributions in Monte Carlo trials had entries consisting of a normally
distributed random variable with zero mean and standard deviation of 1% of
the measurement value corresponding to the entry in n. Distributions of mea-
surement residuals for determining baseline values and attack detectability
were generated by executing state estimation using 500 different noise vec-
tors. The residual threshold used to establish the baseline as described in the
previous section was the 99th percentile (i.e. 1% false alarms). D-FACTS
devices were added to branches 4, 8, and 12, allowing the series reactance
to be modified by 5%. As before, attacks consist of the columns of the DC
H-matrix used in DC state estimation. Attack magnitude was not varied.
Instead, attacks were all normalized at the 100MW level.
4.2.2 Establishing Baseline
To establish expected distributions of parameter estimate residues due to
measurement noise, the state estimation was performed with the addition of
random noise vectors on measurements. The threshold used to establish the
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baseline as described in the previous section was 99%.
Histograms of the sum of squared errors of parameter estimates were gen-
erated from this data. From these histogram bin counts, a cumulative density
function plot was created by normalizing the histogram to have an area of
1 and computing the cumulative sum of bin counts. The 99% cutoff was
established by finding the sum of squared residue value of the CDF at the
99th percentile.
4.2.3 Determining Detectability
Distributions of residuals were created for parameter residues when the sys-
tem was unperturbed and under attack, and for attacks against a perturbed
system. These distributions were compared to the baseline residuals to de-
termine the effects of attacks on parameter residuals, and to see whether
topology perturbation in combination with parameter estimation enhances
the detectability of malicious data injection attacks.
Figure 4.5 shows a comparison of parameter residue distributions. The
unattacked system has the lowest residues, and is shown at the far left of
the plot. For this attack, the parameter estimates for an unperturbed sys-
tem would be a good indicator, as we see that most of the area under the
CDF for the attacked, unperturbed system (dot-dash) falls above the cutoff
established for normal data. The effect of perturbation in this case is to shift
the CDF even higher, indicating improved detection of attacks. This effect
is also present at lower attack levels, albeit to a lesser extent, as seen for an
attack at the 50MW level in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.5: CDF of sum of squared residues of parameter estimates for
unattacked system (solid), attacked system without topology perturbation
(dot-dash), and with perturbation (dotted). Horizontal line (dashed)
indicates 99th percentile under normal conditions. Vertical line (dashed)
indicates value for sum of squared residues corresponding to 99th
percentile. Attacks were at 100MW level.
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Figure 4.6: CDF of sum of squared residues of parameter estimates for
unattacked system (solid), attacked system without topology perturbation
(dot-dash), and with perturbation (dotted). Horizontal line (dashed)
indicates 99th percentile under normal conditions. Vertical line (dashed)
indicates value for sum of squared residues corresponding to 99th
percentile. Attacks were at 50MW level.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The simplifying assumptions made by an attacker using a linear model to
construct attacks against a non-linear state estimator do not affect all mea-
surement types equally. The DC model was shown to introduce very little
residue on real power flow measurements in comparison to generators. Gen-
erators, which must supply losses, accumulate the effects of attacks. We
established in this work that malicious data injection attacks should be ex-
pected to impact some classes of measurements greater than others and that
such differences can be leveraged to detect maliciously injected data.
Parameter residues were also found to increase with data injection at-
tacks. Perturbation of the system in conjunction with parameter estimation
was shown to cause further increase. This increase enhances detectability of
malicious data injection attacks.
We also found that some attacks are hard to detect even at high energy
levels. We intend to study these types of attacks further in the future for
different bus systems and identify ways to detect them. Future work could
include comparisons of residual distributions to ordinary bad data to distin-
guish between bad and malicious data. Another area for future research is
locating which measurements specifically are being attacked if malicious data
injection occurs.
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APPENDIX A
USING MATPOWER STATE ESTIMATION
FOR RESEARCH
A.1 Overview
MATPOWER is a powerful and flexible tool for power system research. It is
open source, and available free online with documentation [16]. The state es-
timation portion of MATPOWER, located in matpower4.1/extras/se was
used both in stock and modified form for the research in this paper. Some
brief documentation specific to the state estimator is available in [17]. This
appendix will provide some instruction for using MATPOWER for state es-
timation and state estimation augmented with parameter estimation to con-
tnue research in this area.
A.2 Generating New Cases
To conduct research on state estimation, it is necessary to generate cases to
study. This section describes how to do this efficiently.
A.2.1 Systems
MATPOWER comes bundled with files for systems ranging from a few buses
to thousands of buses. There may still be need to import systems for re-
search purposes, particularly if specific features are required for the research
(for instance, TCUL transformers, DFACTS devices, capacitor banks, shunt
reactors, etc.). MATPOWER uses a proprietary system data format, how-
ever it is similar in structure to the IEEE common data format (.cdf exten-
sion) and MATPOWER comes with a function for converting from the IEEE
common data format to MATPOWER format.
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The function cdf2matp.m can output a MATPOWER system case file
given a file in the IEEE common data format. This is convenient, because
it allows importation of sytems from any other program capable of saving to
the IEEE common data format, or the use of freely available test cases in
the IEEE format. Unfortunately, the IEEE common data format standard
is looser than cdf2matp.m expects, which can cause parsing errors. During
the course of research for this paper, several systems were constructed in and
imported from PowerWorld. Initially, some of the cases would not properly
import due to header data being longer than allowed for in cdf2matp.m.
This caused MATLAB give an error related to “dimension” of a string or
matrix; parsed text was longer than allocated string length. Reducing the
number of characters in the header line (manually, with a text editor) fixed
this problem.
A.2.2 Measures
In addition to system information, measurement sets are needed to conduct
state estimation. Measurements could be obtained by running a simulation
in PowerWorld or other power system simulator and manually entering the
data into the case file. This is cumbersome, and prone to errors. Instead, it
is better to use MATPOWER’s built in functions to obtain measurements.
For this work, measurement sets were generated by solving the power flow
problem, and then saved as MATLAB vectors. The function runpf.m runs
a power flow, and can output the data needed for state estimation. This
requires returning results as individual output arguments like this:
[baseMVA, bus, gen, branch, success, et] = runpf(casedata);
The desired measures can be found in bus (voltage measurements), gen
(generator injections), branch (line flows). Indicies can be defined to make
it easier to extract the desired measurement types from here by running the
following code.
[PQ, PV, REF, NONE, BUS I, BUS TYPE, PD, QD, GS, BS, BUS AREA,...
VM, VA, BASE KV, ZONE, VMAX, VMIN, LAM P, LAM Q, MU VMAX,...
MU VMIN] = idx bus;
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[F BUS, T BUS, BR R, BR X, BR B, RATE A, RATE B, RATE C, TAP,...
SHIFT, BR STATUS, PF, QF, PT, QT, MU SF, MU ST] = idx brch;
[GEN BUS, PG, QG, QMAX, QMIN, VG, MBASE, GEN STATUS, PMAX,...
PMIN, MU PMAX, MU PMIN, MU QMAX, MU QMIN] = idx gen;
Measurement vectors are then extracted from bus, gen, and branch us-
ing the named indicies. For example, the vector of power flow measure-
ments measured at the “from” end of the line would be saved to the variable
PFvalues like this:
PFvalues = branch(:, PF);
These measures can then be inserted into a state estimation case file. See
test_se.m which comes with the MATPOWER state estimator for an ex-
ample of how the file is formatted. The state estimation case file consists
of five sections. The first section specifies which measurements are to be
used (measurement indicies), this is followed by the values of measurements,
measurement variances, a data integrity check, and a call to run_se.
In addition to measurement indicies, values, and variances, the user must
supply the number of buses (as the variable nbus) and the name of the file
containing the system data (as the variable casename). The state estima-
tion case file is also a good place to augment measures with noise from a
pseudorandom number generator and/or with an attack vector. The “seed”
value for the pseudorandom number generator can be used to control for spe-
cific random noise regimes when comparing different attacks, allowing two
different attacks to be tested against the same noise distributions.
A.2.3 Attacks
The function DCH.m was created to generate attack vectors. An entire DC
H-matrix is generated in the file, and then the specified column is returned.
The entries in the DC H-matrix are generated from sums of line reactances,
but attention must be paid to signs depending on the direction of the line.
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A.3 Parameter Estimation
For this research, modified versions of MATPOWER were created that added
network parameter estimation to state estimation. Initially modified to es-
timate transformer tap positions, code was eventually generated for line re-
actance and resistance as well. These versions of MATPOWER have the
directory names matpower4.1_TAP, matpower4.1_Xs, and matpower4.1_Rs
respectively. The differences between these MATPOWER flavors is merely
the sensitivity functions called in doSE.m. Because the tap position estima-
tor was written first, the other versions may still have variables containing
the word “tap”, even though a different parameter is actually being esti-
mated. It may be desirable to modify MATPOWER in the future to allow
selection of parameter to be estimated by passing an input parameter. (e.g.
Calling run_se with the parameter ”t” would execute state estimation with
transformer tap position estimation. The parameter ”x” would cause line
reactances to be estimated, and so on.) This would reduce the amount of
code to maintain.
Although it was not done for this work, it is possible to estimate multiple
types of parameters at once. However, it was not trivial to get a single
parameter type to work properly, and adding more will complicate things.
A.3.1 Algorithm
The algorithm used to perform parameter estimation is based on the state
augmentation, described in [1] on page 289 and also here in Sections 2.2 and
3.3.1.
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Table A.1: Functions in MATPOWER State Estimation
Function Purpose
run_se.m “Main” function, containing calls to the other
functions
checkDataIntegrity.m Checks input data for completeness
isobservable.m Checks for observability
doSE.m Computes state estimates using an iterative
process
outputsesoln.m Prints the resuts of state estimation
A.3.2 Modifications to MATPOWER
MATPOWER state estimation is conducted using the functions discussed
in Table A.1. Of these, the functions modified to augment states with
parameters is in Table A.2. The functions checkDataIntegrity.m and
isobservable.m were not critical and were left unmodified. If problems
are encountered because of this (and the problem is not a genuine one) calls
to these functions can be commented out. The file run_se.m did not need
to be modified, as it only contains calls to other functions. To create the
H-matrix, functions capable of returning sensitivities (partial derivatives) of
measurements with respect to parameters are required. These functions are
similar to the functions dSbr_dV.m and dSbus_dV.m, and are listed in Table
A.3.
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Table A.2: Functions modified for parameter estimation
Function Modification
doSE.m Outside the main loop many variables were
augmented to include parameters. Inside the
main loop matrix H was modified to include
sensitivites of measures to parameters, and
modifications were made to compute new
parameter estimates and update values.
outputsesoln.m Modified to print parameter estimates.
state estimation case files When creating case files, variables for
measurement indicies, values, and variances
must include fields for parameters.
Table A.3: Functions created for parameter estimation
Function Purpose
dSbr_dTAP/Xs/Rs.m Returns sensitivities of real and reactive
flows (PF, PT, QF, QT) w.r.t. TAP/Xs/Rs
dSG_dTAP/Xs/Rs.m Returns sensitivities of real and reactive
injections (PG, QG) w.r.t. TAP/Xs/Rs
dV_dTAP/Xs/Rs.m Returns sensitivities of voltage (Va, Vm) w.r.t.
TAP/Xs/Rs
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A.3.3 Repetitive Trials
The state estimation case file containing measurement values was modified
to add input parameters for simulations requiring repetitive trials. Inputs
added were col (column number from the DC H-matrix corresponding to
an attack), a (attack magnitude scaling factor), n (noise magnitude scaling
factor), and seed (seed value for pseudorandom number generator). The
function rng(seed) was introduced in MATLAB R2011a (described in [18]).
Use of this seeding function makes R2011a or newer required to use this
method.
For running trials, a script can then call the modified function in a loop
allowing the attack space to be explored systematically under many different
attack and noise realizations. For this research, nested loops were used to test
each of the attack vectors possible at varying magnitudes for many different
noise realizations. This requires a loop for the attack column, a loop for the
attack scaling, and a loop for the noise selection.
Function calls to generate the attacks and noise vectors were made in-
side the case file based on parameters passed by the trial script. The actual
generation of noise and attack vectors was performed each time the state
estimation case file was called. This means that many of the same noise vec-
tors were generated multiple times under different attacks. For performance,
it may have been adventageous to pass the actual attack and noise vectors,
rather than parameters specifying them. This would have allowed noise and
attack vectors to be precomputed and stored, saving computation time per
trial. This was not done for the sake of expediting code development.
In MATLAB, printing output to the screen slows performance consider-
ably. To speed up repetitive trials, the output results portion of run_se.m
were suppressed via commenting. Similarly, integrity and observability check-
ing of data were suppressed by comment. While it may be desirable to run
checks on a measurement case file one time, there is no need to check the
integrity of the same case file at each iteration; if the check is passed once,
it will be passed every time.
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